

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION  
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FOI/PA# 1366648-0

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~~SECRET~~

1 - Mr. Lee

EX-117

June 28, 1972

REC-70105-216642-B7

16445

RE: GOLDFINCH

Reference is made to your memorandum dated June 20, 1972, your reference PF 884.

This is to advise that one copy of the report furnished with your referenced memorandum has been passed to the [redacted] along with a set of the original questions propounded by this Bureau.

b7E

1 - London-by O-7, 6/30/72 cg

Delivered to Washington Representative of [redacted] on 6/30/72  
by [redacted]

b7D

CC: [redacted]  
1 - Foreign Liaison Desk  
REC-70105-216642

[redacted]  
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This is classified "SECRET" since it refers to information classified by [redacted] had furnished a paper prepared by [redacted] (known by the code name of Goldfinch) and suggested that [redacted] might desire to furnish a copy to [redacted] and asked to be advised if we did pass this to [redacted]

0 AUG 3

5/17, 1973

Mr. Miller, E. S.	Rm. 824 (9&D)
Mr. D. E. Moore	Open--Close
Mr. Wannall	[redacted]
Mr. Boynton	Steno Pool
Mr. Branigan	Correct
Mr. R. D. Cotter	Please Call Me
Mr. Cregar	Please See Me
Mr. G. C. Moore	Mail Room, 5531
Mr. F. S. Putman	Foreign Liaison Desk
Mr. Shackelford	
Mr. T. J. Smith	

b6  
b7C

[redacted]

RECORDS BRANCH

Consolidation Unit, 7235
Place on Record & Return
Note File # and Return
R/S to Rm.
Service Unit, 6524

Room \_\_\_\_\_

SUPERVISORS

[redacted]

[redacted]

Mr. Schlarman [initials]  
Mr. Smith, A. E. [initials]

5-7 (Rev. 4-13-73)

INTELLIGENCE DIVISION - FBI  
CI-1 SECTION

6/7/1973, 1973

Mr. Miller, E. S.  
Mr. D. E. Moore  
Mr. Wannall  
Mr. Boynton  
Mr. Branigan  
Mr. R. D. Cotter  
Mr. Cregar  
Mr. G. C. Moore  
Mr. F. S. Putman  
Mr. Shackelford  
Mr. T. J. Smith

Rm. 824 (9&D)

Open--Close

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Steno Pool

b7C

Correct

Please Call Me

Please See Me

Mail Room, 5531

Foreign Liaison Desk

RECORDS BRANCH

Consolidation Unit, 7235

Place on Record & Return

Note File # and Return

R/S to Rm.

Service Unit, 6524

Room

SUPERVISORS

✓ Mr. Schiarman

✓ Mr. Smith, A. E.

FD-5  
Revised  
08/05/2008

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION  
SERIAL CHARGE-OUT

\* This form is consolidated with the old FD-654, based on a Sentinel review.

Date 11-27-12

Document Classification:  Unclass  Confidential  Secret  Top Secret (U)

Document Type:  Letter  Airtel  LHM  Memo  Report  
 Facsimile  Teletype  Misc  EC  Email  
Enclosure \_\_\_\_\_ Attachment \_\_\_\_\_

SCI TYPE: \*requires special handling

SJ\*  TK\*  GAMMA\*  COSMIC(NATO)  
 HCS\*  SSRP\*  BYE\*  Other \_\_\_\_\_ (specify)

FD-501 Number \_\_\_\_\_

Date of Mail July 30, 1974

Originating Office or agency \_\_\_\_\_

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Special File Room, FBIHQ  FBIHQ, Room \_\_\_\_\_

Field Office-Room # Container # or Other Location Where Material Is Stored

File 105-216642 Case No. 105-216642 Last Serial


Pending  Closed

Serial No.

105-216642 Description of Serial

Date Charged

11-27-12

Employee 

RECHARGE

Date 11-27-12

To \_\_\_\_\_

From \_\_\_\_\_

Initials of  
Clerk

SERIAL CHARGE OUT

EXEMPTED FROM AUTOMATIC

DECLASSIFICATION

AUTHORITY DERIVED FROM:

FBI AUTOMATIC DECLASSIFICATION GUIDE

EXEMPTION CODE: 50X(1-HUM)

DATE 08-05-2015

BY: C32W33B91

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED  
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED EXCEPT  
WHERE SHOWN OTHERWISE

F B I

~~SECRET~~ (U)

Date: 6/11/74

Transmit the following in \_\_\_\_\_

(Type in plaintext or code)

Via AIRTEL

(Priority)

TO: DIRECTOR, FBI (105-53457)  
FROM: SAC, NEW YORK (105-21666) (P)  
SUBJECT: [REDACTED]

(OO: NY)

*CARBON COPY*

[REDACTED] subject since 1960.

[REDACTED] source had not seen

On 6/3/74, source attended a performance of the  
Violin Ensemble of the Bolshoi Theatre at Carnegie Hall NYC

ORIGINAL FILED IN

105-216642-533

b6  
b7C

b1  
b3

b1  
b3

b1  
b3

⑥ - Bureau (RM)  
(1 - 105-216642) (TSURKAN)

~~SECRET~~ (U)

Classified by 5806  
Exempt from GDS 2,3  
Date of Declassification  
Indefinite

1 - New York  
1 - New York

1 - New York

b1  
b3

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b7C

105-216642-

NOT RECORDED

126 JUN 21 1974

b1  
b3

PPG:caf

(16)

Approved: JUL 1 1974

Special Agent in Charge

Sent \_\_\_\_\_ M Per \_\_\_\_\_

U.S. Government Printing Office: 1972 -- 455-574

~~SECRET~~

b1  
b3

NY 105-21666

(S)

- 2 -

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

NY 105-21666

b1  
b3

(S)

- 3 -

~~(U)~~

~~SECRET~~

NY 105-21666

b1  
b3

(S)

[REDACTED]

Observations of NYO

In view of [REDACTED]  
[REDACTED] it appears highly unlikely that source  
be picked up again by KGB.

b6  
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(S)

[REDACTED] If source is picked up again by  
the KGB, there are several questions the KGB would want answered.

b1  
b3

(S)

Undoubtedly [REDACTED] will meet with source to obtain answers  
to their questions prior to source's involvement again with  
the KGB. This situation was discussed with source and he is  
prepared for [REDACTED] questioning and is confident he will  
be convincing.

b1  
b3

(S)

[REDACTED]

~~SECRET~~ / (U)

~~SECRET~~ /<sup>(U)</sup>

NY 105-21666



(S)

b1  
b3

- 5 -

~~SECRET~~ /<sup>(U)</sup>

F B I

Date: 3/21/74

Transmit the following in \_\_\_\_\_  
(Type in plaintext or code)

Via AIRTEL  
(Priority)

TO: DIRECTOR, FBI  
FROM: SAC, NEWARK (105-) (P)  
SUBJECT: [REDACTED]

Re: Newark airtel to Bureau dated 8/30/73, captioned  
IS-R", with enclosed LHM entitled  
"LOCKHEED ELECTRONICS COMPANY, INC. CONTACT WITH  
SOVIET NATIONALS".

Enclosed for the Bureau are seven (7) copies of an  
LHM captioned and dated as above.

Enclosed for New York are three (3) copies and WFO  
two (2) copies of same LHM.

Source mentioned is LHM is [REDACTED] and he advised  
he will be returning to Moscow, USSR, [REDACTED] at which  
[REDACTED]

OLEG A. LYALIN, mentioned in LHM, was identified as  
a captain in KGB, Line V (Sabotage and Assassination), in the  
London KGB Residency at the time of his defection (NYfile  
105-115626) (BUfile 105-216642).

Based on the information set forth in LHM concerning  
subject, he appears to be a member of [REDACTED]  
[REDACTED] It is noted that LYALIN's defection played a  
major role in the expulsion of the Soviet personnel from  
England in 1971, and therefore, [REDACTED] would be personally  
knowledgeable of LYALIN's defection.

3-Bureau (Enc. 7)  
(1-105-216642)  
2-WFO (Enc. 2)  
3-New York (Enc. 3)  
(1-105-216642)  
3-Newark  
(1-  
DGW/sjf  
(11)

ENCLOSURE

CARBON COPY

105-216642  
NOT RECORDED  
42 MAY 2 1974

Approved: \_\_\_\_\_ Sent: \_\_\_\_\_ M Per: \_\_\_\_\_

: Special Agent in Charge

★ U. S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE: 1971-413-138

55 MAY 7 1974

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b7D  
UNREC COPY FILED IN 105-237870-4

b6  
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b7D

NK 105-

The enclosed LHM is classified "Secret" to protect the source who is the only individual privy to the information set forth concerning subject.

An effort to fully exploit the situation set forth in LHM, the Bureau is requested to obtain through liaison, the [REDACTED] all available information concerning [REDACTED] and provide this to Newark so that [REDACTED] can be properly briefed in targeting towards [REDACTED]

The Bureau is also requested to consider the possibility of having [REDACTED] contacted and determine if [REDACTED] is known to him.

IN VIEW OF THE SENSITIVITY OF [REDACTED]  
EXTREME CAUTION MUST BE EXERCISED IN THE HANDLING OF ANY INFORMATION ATTRIBUTED TO THIS SOURCE AND NO ACTION TAKEN WHICH COULD CONCEIVABLY JEOPARDIZE THE SECURITY OF THIS SOURCE OF INFORMATION.

IN THE EVENT ATTACHED INFORMATION IS TO BE DISSEMINATED FURTHER, EXTREME CAUTION SHOULD BE UTILIZED IN REPORTING THE MANNER IN WHICH INFORMATION WAS OBTAINED BY [REDACTED]

IN COMMUNICATIONS PREPARED FOR DISSEMINATION OUTSIDE THE BUREAU, [REDACTED] SHOULD BE CHARACTERIZED AS "A SOURCE WHO HAS FURNISHED RELIABLE INFORMATION IN THE PAST". IT SHOULD THEREAFTER STATE THAT THIS INFORMATION WAS RECENTLY RECEIVED FROM THIS SOURCE AND NO DATE SHOULD BE SET FORTH IN THE DISSEMINATION.

For the information of recipient offices, a photograph of [REDACTED] taken in July, 1973, appears on Page 11 of referenced LHM.

LEADS

NEW YORK

[REDACTED] AT NEW YORK, NEW YORK: Will review indices regarding

b6  
b7C  
b7D  
b7E

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b6  
b7C

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b7C

NK 105-

WFO

AT WASHINGTON, DC: Will review indices and contact  
[redacted] for any information concerning [redacted]

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b7C

~~SECRET~~



UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

Newark, New Jersey

March 21, 1974

In Reply, Please Refer to  
File No.



A source advised [redacted]

USSR, [redacted]

the US/USSR Symposium on Aeronautics and Astronautics co-sponsored by the American Institute of Aeronautics and Astronautics (AIAA) and the USSR State Committee for Science and Technology.

b6  
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Source felt that during this visit to the USSR all [redacted]

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b7C  
b7D

This document contains neither recommendations nor conclusions of the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI). It is the property of the FBI and is loaned to your agency; it and its contents are not to be distributed outside your agency.

SOURCES WHOSE IDENTITIES ARE CONCEALED HEREIN HAVE FURNISHED RELIABLE INFORMATION IN THE PAST, EXCEPT WHERE OTHERWISE NOTED.

~~SECRET~~

CLASSIFIED BY.....5071.....  
EXEMPT FROM GENERAL DECLASSIFICATION  
SCHEDULE OF EXECUTIVE ORDER 11652  
PRIORITY/CATEGORY...2...and...3.....Indefinite  
AUTOMATICALLY DECLASSIFIED ON.....  
105-216642

ENCLOSURE

~~SECRET~~

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[redacted]  
The source made the observation that [redacted]

[redacted]  
Since this original meeting, this source [redacted]

[redacted]  
As a result of source's [redacted]

[redacted]  
During the period [redacted]

[redacted]  
Initially upon [redacted]

[redacted]  
Soviet Union Diplomatic Corps  
in Great Britain [redacted]

[redacted]  
Great  
Britain. At this time the British Government accused 150 Soviet  
Diplomates of conducting espionage activites and declared them  
persona non grata. [redacted]

[redacted]  
Upon returning to Moscow, USSR, [redacted]

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

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b7D

[redacted]  
Based on investigation and/or his  
activities [redacted]

[redacted] stated that in 1970, [redacted]  
Japan, [redacted]

While engaging source in a conversation concerning [redacted]  
USSR, [redacted]

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

b6  
b7C  
b7D

[redacted]  
Oleg Adolfovich Lyalin is a Soviet National who defected to the British Government in September, 1971. Based on investigation and/or his activities, Lyalin was considered [redacted] at the time of his defection.

Also during this discussion, source learned that [redacted]

Source [redacted]

[redacted]

~~SECRET~~

FD-5  
Revised  
08/05/2008

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION  
SERIAL CHARGE-OUT

\* This form is consolidated with the old FD-654, based on a Sentinel review.

Date 11/27/12

Document Classification:  Unclass  Confidential  Secret  Top Secret (U)

Document Type:  Letter  Airtel  LHM  Memo  Report  
 Facsimile  Teletype  Misc  EC  Email  
Enclosure \_\_\_\_\_ Attachment \_\_\_\_\_

SCI TYPE: \*requires special handling

SJ\*  TK\*  GAMMA\*  COSMIC(NATO)  
 HCS\*  SSRP\*  BYE\*  Other \_\_\_\_\_ (specify)

FD-501 Number \_\_\_\_\_

Date of Mail Oct 10, 1974

Originating Office or agency \_\_\_\_\_

This serial has been removed and placed in:

Special File Room, FBIHQ  FBIHQ, Room \_\_\_\_\_

Field Office-Room # Container # or Other Location Where Material Is Stored

File \_\_\_\_\_ Class. \_\_\_\_\_ Office of Origin \_\_\_\_\_ Case No. 105-216642 Last Serial \_\_\_\_\_

Pending  Closed

Serial No. 105-216642 Description of Serial \_\_\_\_\_ Date Charged 11-27-12  
\_\_\_\_\_  
\_\_\_\_\_  
\_\_\_\_\_

Employee YK RECHARGE Date \_\_\_\_\_

To \_\_\_\_\_ From \_\_\_\_\_

Initials of  
Clerk \_\_\_\_\_

SERIAL CHARGE-OUT

FD-5  
Revised  
08/05/2008

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION  
SERIAL CHARGE-OUT

\* This form is consolidated with the old FD-654, based on a Sentinel review.

Date 11-27-12

Document Classification:  Unclass  Confidential  Secret  Top Secret ~~(U)~~

Document Type:  Letter  Airtel  LHM  Memo  Report  
 Facsimile  Teletype  Misc  EC  Email  
Enclosure \_\_\_\_\_ Attachment \_\_\_\_\_

SCI TYPE: \*requires special handling

SJ\*  TK\*  GAMMA\*  COSMIC(NATO)  
 HCS\*  SSRP\*  BYE\*  Other \_\_\_\_\_ (specify)

FD-501 Number

Date of Mail 9/24/1974

Originating Office or agency \_\_\_\_\_

This serial has been removed and placed in:


Special File Room, FBIHQ  FBIHQ, Room \_\_\_\_\_

Field Office-Room # Container # or Other Location Where Material Is Stored

File 105-216642 Case No. 105-216642 Last Serial

Pending  Closed

Serial No. 105-216642 Description of Serial \_\_\_\_\_ Date Charged 11-27-12

Employee 

RECHARGE

Date 11-27-12

To \_\_\_\_\_

From \_\_\_\_\_

Initials of  
Clerk

SERIAL CHARGE-OUT

FD-5  
Revised  
08/05/2008

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION  
SERIAL CHARGE-OUT

\* This form is consolidated with the old FD-654, based on a Sentinel review.

Date 11/27/12

Document Classification:  Unclass  Confidential  Secret  Top Secret (U)

Document Type:  Letter  Airtel  LHM  Memo  Report  
 Facsimile  Teletype  Misc  EC  Email  
Enclosure \_\_\_\_\_ Attachment \_\_\_\_\_

SCI TYPE: \*requires special handling

SI\*  TK\*  GAMMA\*  COSMIC(NATO)  
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FD-501 Number

Date of Mail Aug 27, 1974

Originating Office or agency \_\_\_\_\_

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Special File Room, FBIHQ  FBIHQ, Room \_\_\_\_\_

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File 105-216642 Class. \_\_\_\_\_ Office of Origin \_\_\_\_\_ Case No. \_\_\_\_\_ Last Serial \_\_\_\_\_

Pending  Closed

Serial No. 105-216642 Description of Serial \_\_\_\_\_ Date Charged 11-27-12  
\_\_\_\_\_  
\_\_\_\_\_  
\_\_\_\_\_

Employee [Signature]

RECHARGE

Date 11-27-12

To \_\_\_\_\_ From \_\_\_\_\_

Initials of  
Clerk

SERIAL CHARGE-OUT

卷之三

1 - Mr. E. C. Peterson

June 30, 1976

16770

## **RE: GOLD FINGER**

We have your reports by captioned dated October 18, 1971, and February 16, 1972, your references SF. 59/11 and PF 384 respectively, which contain material suggesting evidence of possible indicators which might be documented through analyzing movement of Line V officers and/or Line V agents suggesting imminent or hostilities.

It would be most helpful to us if you could explore this subject matter with Goldfinch. We would be especially interested in knowing if he is able to furnish specific periods of advance warning of the situations cited in references after which a more specific indication of Soviet intentions might be made.

1 - Legat, London

sent by O-7  
6/30/76 HCF-pdd

b7D

## 1 - Foreign Liaison Unit

1 -

ECP:mcm/dmt  
(7) *dmt*

SEE NOTE PAGE TWO

Delivered to Washington Representative of  
by *pld*

on 6/30/76

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REC-50

~~Classified by 7157 Cb 7C  
Exempt from GDS Categories 2 and 3  
Date of Declassification Indefinite~~

4 JUL 2 1976

RECEIVED

70JUL 13 1976  
*PSS*

~~SECRET~~

RE: GOLDFINCH

NOTE:

SA Peterson made presentation at DIA Indications and Warning Seminar 6/10/76 concerning possible contribution in these areas which might be derived from clandestine counter-intelligence operations. Three areas as possible source material were cited as being recruitments-in-place, knowledge of activities by illegals and/or double agents. Mention was made of some information from subject and coordinator of seminar asked if the information requested from the British could be secured if it were not already available to you. Upon receipt of requested information, a response will be prepared for transmittal to General Frauar, DIA.

~~SECRET~~

FD-5  
Revised  
08/05/2008

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION  
SERIAL CHARGE-OUT

\* This form is consolidated with the old FD-654, based on a Sentinel review.

Date 11/27/12

Document Classification:  Unclass  Confidential  Secret  Top Secret (U)

Document Type:  Letter  Airtel  LHM  Memo  
 Facsimile  Teletype  Misc  EC  
Enclosure \_\_\_\_\_ Attachment \_\_\_\_\_

Report  
 Email

SCI TYPE: \*requires special handling

SI\*  TK\*  GAMMA\*  COSMIC(NATO)  
 HCS\*  SSRP\*  BYE\*  Other \_\_\_\_\_ (specify)

FD-501 Number

Date of Mail Oct 8, 1976

Originating Office or agency

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Special File Room, FBIHQ  FBIHQ, Room \_\_\_\_\_

Field Office-Room # Container # or Other Location Where Material Is Stored

File 140 Office of Origin 105-216642 Case No. 140  
Class. \_\_\_\_\_ Last Serial

Pending  Closed

Serial No.

140 Description of Serial 105-216642-105

Date Charged

11-27-12

Employee

RECHARGE

Date

To \_\_\_\_\_ From \_\_\_\_\_  
Initials of Clerk

SERIAL CHARGE-OUT

FD-5  
Revised  
08/05/2008

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION  
SERIAL CHARGE-OUT

\* This form is consolidated with the old FD-654, based on a Sentinel review.

Date 11/27/12

Document Classification:  Unclass  Confidential  Secret  Top Secret (U)

Document Type:  Letter  Airtel  LHM  Memo  Report  
 Facsimile  Teletype  Misc  EC  Email  
Enclosure \_\_\_\_\_ Attachment \_\_\_\_\_

SCI TYPE: \*requires special handling

SJ\*  TK\*  GAMMA\*  COSMIC(NATO)  
 HCS\*  SSRP\*  BYE\*  Other \_\_\_\_\_ (specify)

FD-501 Number \_\_\_\_\_

Date of Mail July 21, 1976

Originating Office or agency \_\_\_\_\_

This serial has been removed and placed in:


Special File Room, FBIHQ  FBIHQ. Room \_\_\_\_\_

Field Office-Room # Container # or Other Location Where Material Is Stored

File \_\_\_\_\_ Class. \_\_\_\_\_ Office of Origin 105-216642 Case No. \_\_\_\_\_ Last Serial \_\_\_\_\_

Pending  Closed

Serial No.	Description of Serial	Date Charged
_____	<u>105-216642</u>	<u>11-27-12</u>
_____	_____	_____
_____	_____	_____
_____	_____	_____
_____	_____	_____

Employee 

RECHARGE

Date \_\_\_\_\_

To \_\_\_\_\_ From \_\_\_\_\_

Initials of  
Clerk

SERIAL CHARGE-OUT

~~SECRET~~

1 - Mr. R.G. Kinsey

BY LIAISON

DATE: October 29, 1976

TO: Director  
Defense Intelligence Agency

Attention: Major General Lincoln D. Faurer, USAF  
Deputy Director for Intelligence

From: Clarence M. Kelley, Director

Subject: INDICATIONS AND WARNING (I & W) SEMINAR  
JUNE 9 - 10, 1976

In connection with captioned seminar, Special Agent Eugene G. Peterson of this Bureau presented a briefing on "Possible Counterintelligence - Clandestine Operations Contributions to I & W." In connection therewith, Special Agent Peterson explained the functions performed by Committee for State Security (KGB) intelligence officers performing illegals support functions or activities connected with a component of the KGB responsible for sabotage and/or assassinations (Line V). (C)

It was explained that coverage of activities of these individuals or analyses of assignments given by them to controlled assets might provide some input of I & W. A participant in the seminar asked Special Agent Peterson [redacted]

ORIGINATING UNIT 62 - 1073861 - 151

b7D

62-197281

1 - 65-105-31864  
ECP:mcm (5)

(Goldfinch) ~~SECRET~~

Classified by 7157

Exempt from EDS, Categories 1, 2 and 3

Date of Declassification Indefinite

NOT RECORDED

191 NOV. 5 1976

SEE NOTE PAGE TWO

DUPLICATE YELLOW

55 NOV 19 1976

~~SECRET~~

Director  
Defense Intelligence Agency

The following [redacted]

b7D

[redacted]  
[redacted]  
~~10~~ This material is being provided for your information in response to the question posed during captioned seminar. (U)

NOTE:

The information, above, was received from [redacted] b7D in a communication dated 9/9/76 captioned "Goldfinch," in response to an interrogatory directed to it. (S) (U)

~~SECRET~~

FD-5  
Revised  
08/05/2008

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION  
SERIAL CHARGE-OUT

\* This form is consolidated with the old FD-654, based on a Sentinel review.

Date 11/27/12

Document Classification:  Unclass  Confidential  Secret  Top Secret  (U)

Document Type:  Letter  Airtel  LHM  Memo  Report  Facsimile  Teletype  Misc  BG  Email  
Enclosure \_\_\_\_\_ Attachment \_\_\_\_\_

SCI TYPE: \*requires special handling

SJ\*  TK\*  GAMMA\*  COSMIC(NATO)  
 HCS\*  SSRP\*  BYE\*  Other \_\_\_\_\_ (specify)

FD-501 Number

Date of Mail January 19, 1977

Originating Office or agency \_\_\_\_\_

This serial has been removed and placed in:

Special File Room, FBIHQ  FBIHQ. Room \_\_\_\_\_

Field Office-Room # Container # or Other Location Where Material Is Stored

File 142  
Class.

Office of Origin \_\_\_\_\_

105-216642

Case No.

142  
Last Serial

Pending  Closed

Serial No.  
142

Description of Serial  
105-216642-142

Date Charged  
11/27/12

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Date \_\_\_\_\_

From \_\_\_\_\_

Initials of  
Clerk

SERIAL CHARGE-OUT

~~SECRET~~

1174

b6  
b7C

5 April 1977

For the attention of Mr Peterson

DISRUPTION OPERATIONS - GOLDFINCH

1. We attach a write-up of a recent interview with the Soviet defector LYALIN (GOLDFINCH) in which his advice was sought on what direction possible disruption operations should take.

2. Our view is that the operations which might arise from this paper should be aimed at RIS officers who are considered not to be targets for recruitment; those about whom too little is known to make a reasonable judgement should not normally be considered as disruption targets. The other main criterion is that the operation should be cost-effective. It is unlikely to be worthwhile going to great expense to upset one middle-grade RIS officer. This does not mean that schemes requiring careful planning and of some duration should not be considered; only that operations should not absorb an excessive amount of time, effort and money.

REC-92


b6  
b7C

105-216642-143

ST-106

JUL 8 1977

ENCLOSURE



~~SECRET~~

246  
3 JUN 2 1977

1. [redacted] asked GOLDFINCH to consider ways and means by which we could harass selected intelligence officers in the Russian community, mainly with a view to forcing the withdrawal of selected individuals. GOLDFINCH considered the matter and gave us his views on two cassettes of tape. The following is a distilled account of his views.

2. In distinguishing between the intelligence community and the rest of the mission GOLDFINCH refers to the non-intelligence officers of both the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and the Ministry of Foreign Trade as "the clear community", and this will be used in the following notes.

3. GOLDFINCH isolates the susceptibilities of intelligence officer; and others into the three great evils of drink, women and money, and they are dealt with below in this order.

Drink

4. A fair amount of Russian drink, -vodka, wines and spirits-is sold through the Co-Operative shop, but it is always limited in order to reduce the amount of drinking which is always a problem within a Russian community. Nevertheless it is fairly readily available and the selling of such drink to locals would be a major crime. From time to time IOs would give presents of such drink, but in this case an official note would be made of it, and it would not therefore be possible for anyone found selling to non-Russians to get away with it. A very damaging ploy would be to suggest that an Intelligence Officer had bought electronic radio equipment or cameras through selling Russian liquor to the locals.

5. The KGB and GRU have access to local wine and spirits through the KGB canteen. Those are sold at very reduced rates. From time to time the "clear community" will ask IOs to buy such drink for them and this is sometimes done but not always. There is not unnaturally a certain amount of resentment at the facilities available to the IOs; if therefore an IO were sold Hi-Fi equipment at a very cheap rate and it was then put about that he had obtained it through selling off drink from the KGB canteen, the results might be spectacular. It would not be possible to check on the disposal of the drink and it would of course be advisable that no receipts were given for the electronic equipment.

6. A number of STD officers spend time in trying to get invitations from their colleagues to join them in visits to local firms. This is done in the hope of getting free booze or presents and it might be possible on occasions to exploit this by passing stories through the officer's "clear" superiors or the Party organisation.

7. Straight drinking is accepted within the Soviet community, and drunkenness is not a crime. What would however be damaging would be any question of complaints from neighbours or stories in the press about wild parties and bottle throwing (apparently a common Russian sport). If the stories could be substantiated by the production of Russian bottles then so much the better.

Women

8. The general Russian attitude over women is that it is the fools that get caught and they are the ones who deserve to suffer. GOLDFINCH said that he did not care much if we knew about his amours, but he certainly did not want the KGB to know.

9. There is of course a good deal of assorted sex within the Russian community, and provided that this is reasonably discreet no-one will pay too much attention to it. If matters however, get out of hand and there is any danger of a public scandal, then people are sent home.

10. Outside the Soviet community things are different, and in theory any relationship with a local woman would lead to the repatriation of the official concerned. The intelligent KGB officer will of course declare his interest in a woman by suggesting that she is a potential intelligence recruit, and provided he has already reported this contact he can usually get away with it, provided again that reasonable discretion is shown.

11. If a Russian IO were to cause a girl to become pregnant then the matter would be treated very very seriously. This would be even more important if the girl attempted to demand marriage or to be taken to Russia. A careful and detailed investigation would be mounted and of course the officer might get away with it in the end. It would however stop any intelligence work by the officer concerned, and even an unproven rumour of this nature might hang over the individual concerned for sometime. It would be very important in circumstances such as this for rumours to be passed through the "clear community" or the Party organisation. If it were to go straight to the KGB they would certainly investigate the matter, but on the whole they would probably try to hush it up.

#### Money

12. GOLDFINCH stressed the obsession of the Soviet community with saving money at all costs. This is normally provided for in the purchase of various saving certificates which can be cashed, either in this country or in Russia. However almost all Soviet families in diplomatic posts devote a large part of their efforts to the acquisition of either large sums for the purchase of cars or flats in Russia or for the small sums to obtain clothing, electronic equipment, furs etc some of which they would intend to sell on their return to Russia.

13. Any significant borrowing of money, either within or outside the community is frowned on. There are of course plenty of small fiddles and the usual sort of borrowing of small sums, but anything of a serious nature would be regarded most gravely by the authorities.

14. A crime of the most serious proportions would be for a Russian to hold an account with a local company. Even the ubiquitous credit card can only be held by the Directors of the large Russian firms locally, and this must be with permission from Moscow. Anyone found to be buying on account from local firms would be in great trouble. Any official complaint from the business concerned over a Russian holding an account for his firm could cause the Russian to be charged with robbing the Soviet state, and in Russia this is a crime which can be punished by death.

15. Russian money, in excess of a very small sum must not be taken abroad, and selling roubles for profit locally would again be a crime against the State, for which imprisonment would be mandatory.

#### Blackmail

16. Another serious crime, for which imprisonment is a certainty. All Russians who return to their own country usually have their possessions packed by the same firm. This is done long before the Russian actually leaves this country. If a considerable number of consumer goods, eg nylon raincoats were to find their way into his luggage he would be in considerable trouble if this was found by the customs in Russia. Any rumours that a Russian's luggage contained this sort of thing would have to be passed in good time to enable the appropriate authorities to be warned.

17. In the same way a possible ploy to damage a KGB officer who was on leave in Russia would be the despatch of presents or goods from a local company to the Embassy with a request that they should be delivered in Russia for the individual concerned. The intelligence officer in Moscow will have the greatest of difficulty in extricating himself from this one, and would be unlikely to return to this country.

18. Borrowing from a non-Russian is strictly prohibited, but any accusation of this made against a Russian might well be regarded as a provocation.

19. Gambling in a big way is also unlawful. The odd pound at a race meeting or dog track would be disregarded but any evidence of serious gambling would lead to trouble. A lot of Russians became involved in lotteries in West Germany. On the whole any suggestion they were obtaining money from this source was regarded as a provocation, but if a Russian does accept money from a lottery and does not report it, again he would be in trouble.

20. On the whole shop-lifting is always regarded as a provocation, even though there have been many cases where the Russian community has known perfectly well that the individual is guilty.

22. All drivers, whether in Russia or abroad fiddle the petrol account. There is no problem in drawing as much petrol as is required, and whenever possible drivers will attempt to make a dishonest rouble by disposing of some of the petrol for cash. This is a serious crime, but of course very difficult to prove.

23. An intelligence officer, in submitting a bill for a meal, has to certify that at least two people were involved in that meal. Any suggestion that phoney bills were being submitted could lead to an investigation.

24. Any presents received by any Russian trade official are supposed to be handed over to the house manager for disposal. At Christmas time most of the trade officials spend a lot of time visiting firms in order to collect their gifts in person, and so avoid handing them over. Although this is general practice failure to report gifts is not well regarded.

25. Another matter related to commercial dealings is the common practice among Russians of warning the local company of the maximum price to which the Russian purchasers will go, and subsequently taking a cut for this information. Clearly such a practice would not be well regarded by the Russian authorities, but obviously it would be very difficult to prove what had happened.

General

26. GOLDFINCH concluded his tapes by stressing once again the importance of passing information and rumours through the "clear" community or the Party organisation. He also stressed that any suggestion of press publicity would add to the seriousness of any allegation. It would also stop the KGB from trying to keep things quiet.

27. As a finale GOLDFINCH, with bated breath, mentioned the question of venereal diseases and implied that to catch this would be the most serious of crimes. Any Russian suspected of being in such a condition would be shipped back to Russia immediately for the fullest investigation, and his family and colleagues would be regarded with great suspicion. GOLDFINCH added no suggestions as to how such a state could be induced or exploited.

FD-5  
Revised  
08/05/2008

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION  
SERIAL CHARGE-OUT

\* This form is consolidated with the old FD-654, based on a Sentinel review.

Date 11/27/12  
~~U~~

Document Classification:  Unclass  Confidential  Secret  Top Secret

Document Type:  Letter  Airtel  LHM  Memo  Report  
 Facsimile  Teletype  Misc  EG  Email  
Enclosure \_\_\_\_\_ Attachment \_\_\_\_\_

SCI TYPE: \*requires special handling

SI\*  TK\*  GAMMA\*  COSMIC(NATO)  
 HCS\*  SSRP\*  BYE\*  Other \_\_\_\_\_ (specify)

FD-501 Number \_\_\_\_\_

Date of Mail March 29, 1977

Originating Office or agency \_\_\_\_\_

This serial has been removed and placed in:


Special File Room, FBIHQ  FBIHQ, Room \_\_\_\_\_

Field Office-Room # Container # or Other Location Where Material Is Stored

File 105-216642 Case No.   Last Serial  

Pending  Closed

Serial No. 105-216642 Description of Serial   Date Charged 11/27/12

Empl 

Date \_\_\_\_\_

To \_\_\_\_\_ From \_\_\_\_\_

Initials of  
Clerk

SERIAL CHARGE-OUT

b6  
b7c

4-528

105-216642-144  
**CHANGED TO**  
105-293013- 77X

MAY 15 1978

NBH /emb

0

Mr. R. L. Leffler

O P S M  
A R D A  
090 P S M  
**TELETYPE**

ROUTINE

~~SECRET~~

APRIL 6, 1978

FM DIRECTOR (105-216642)

TO NEW YORK (105-115626) ROUTINE

BT

~~SECRET~~

OLEG A. LYALIN; ESP - R.

REURTEL FEBRUARY 24, 1978, NO COPY TO NEWARK.

REFERENCED TELETYPE REQUESTED FBIHQ LIAISON WITH [ ] TO b7D  
DETERMINE IF SUBJECT IS AVAILABLE FOR IN-DEPTH INTERVIEW(S)  
SPECIFICALLY WITH REGARD TO HIS KNOWLEDGE OF ILLEGAL RADIO  
COMMUNICATIONS. FBIHQ STRONGLY AGREES WITH YOUR SUGGESTIONS  
AND FEELS THAT INTERVIEW OF LYALIN, ALONG THE LINES YOU HAVE  
SKETCHED, WOULD BE MOST BENEFICIAL. HOWEVER, AT THIS TIME,  
FBIHQ IS NOT INITIATING CONTACT WITH [ ] TO DETERMINE WHETHER  
OR NOT SUBJECT IS AVAILABLE TO US. (S) (U) C

FOR YOUR INFORMATION, FBIHQ IS PREPARING A STUDY OF SOVIET  
ILLEGAL OPERATIONS IN THE UNITED STATES OVER THE PAST TWENTY  
YEARS. AS ONE OF THE RESULTS OF THE STUDY, IT IS ANTICIPATED  
THAT A NUMBER OF FORMER DEFECTORS WILL BE CONTACTED AND

Assoc. Dir. 1 - Newark (65-5884) (Afflux)

APR 7 1978

Dep. AD Adm. \_\_\_\_\_

Dep. AD Inv. \_\_\_\_\_

Asst. Dir. \_\_\_\_\_

Adm. Serv. \_\_\_\_\_

Crim. Inv. \_\_\_\_\_

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Spec. Inv. \_\_\_\_\_

Tech. Servs. \_\_\_\_\_

Train. \_\_\_\_\_

Public Aff. \_\_\_\_\_

Telephone Rm. \_\_\_\_\_

Director's Sec'y \_\_\_\_\_

SEE NOTE PAGE THREE

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION  
COMMUNICATIONS SECTION

0250 ZR 81-  
APR 07 1978

TELETYPE

58 APR 17 1978  
MAIL ROOM

Teletype

PAGE TWO ~~SECRET~~ 105-216642

QUESTIONED IN VARIOUS AREAS OF SOVIET ILLEGAL ACTIVITIES. SUBJECT IS ONE OF THOSE WITH WHOM CONTACT IS DESIRED. FURTHER, THIS STUDY WILL BE FURNISHED TO ESTABLISHMENT OFFICES FOR THEIR COMMENTS AND OBSERVATIONS. FBIHQ FEELS THAT THIS APPROACH, WHERE DEFECTORS SUCH AS SUBJECT CAN BE QUERIED IN-DEPTH IN ONE SERIES OF INTERVIEWS, WILL PROVE MORE PRODUCTIVE THAN PIECE-MEAL DISCUSSIONS. THE COMPLETION OF THE ABOVE STUDY IS IMMINENT, AND YOU WILL BE ADVISED ACCORDINGLY. (CX)

IN CONJUNCTION WITH THE ABOVE, FBIHQ FEELS [redacted]

b6  
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[redacted] WOULD ALSO BE ABLE TO ADD TO OUR KNOWLEDGE OF SOVIET ILLEGAL ACTIVITIES. FBIHQ WOULD THEREFORE APPRECIATE RECEIVING ANY NOTES, ETC., WHICH RESULTED FROM YOUR REINTERVIEW OF HIM IN 1977. (S) CLASSIFIED BY 7006, RCL XGDS 2 AND 3, INDEFINITE.

BT

#

~~SECRET~~

NOTE:

New York in referenced teletype requested FBIHQ liaison with [redacted] b7D regarding possible interview of subject, a former Soviet defector. Subject had been trained as an illegal and New York, based on its Atlast case experience wishes to interview him particularly with regard to illegal radio communication. Above advises that FBIHQ is taking no action on their request until the completion of a Headquarters study on illegals. It is then anticipated that a more complete and detailed interview can be conducted saving having to do piece-meal type interviews over a long period of time. (S)

*Mr.  
Re*

~~SECRET~~

AIRTEL

1 - M. R. G. Kinsey

1 -

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~~SECRET~~

(U)

6/3/77

To: ADIC, New York  
From: Director, FBI

Enclosures - 2)

IS - R

(S)

b7D

Enclosed for information of each recipient office are two copies of a write-up by [redacted] of a recent interview of Soviet defector source Goldfinch, in which his advice was sought as to possible disruption operations against Soviet personnel. (S) (U)

b7D

Although [redacted] interview primarily was for the purpose of determining means to harass or force the withdrawal of Soviet personnel posted abroad, the susceptibilities and vulnerabilities of intelligence officers cited by Goldfinch are considered pertinent to captioned matter. It is suggested that contents of enclosure be reviewed with appropriate personnel.

[redacted] FOR BACKGROUND INFORMATION. (S) (U)

2 - San Francisco (105-23428) (Enclosures - 2)

2 - WFO (105-136778) (Enclosures - 2)

1 - 105-216642 (Goldfinch)

CAE:mah

(13)

SEE NOTE PAGE 2

EXEMPTED FROM AUTOMATIC  
DECLASSIFICATION  
AUTHORITY DERIVED FROM:  
FBI AUTOMATIC DECLASSIFICATION GUIDE  
EXEMPTION CODE: 25X(1)  
DATE 09-16-2015 BY: C82W33B91

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED  
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED EXCEPT  
WHERE SHOWN OTHERWISE

105-216642-

NOT RECORDED

107 JUN 17 1977

~~SECRET~~

(U)

Classified by 5047  
Exempt from GDS, Categories 1, 2 and 3  
Date of Declassification, Indefinite

246  
53 JUN 27 1977

ROUTE IN ENVELOPE

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~~SECRET~~

Airtel to New York

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NOTE:

(S)  
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[redacted] Goldfinch is [redacted] code name for Oleg A. Lyalin, KGB defector. Comments of Goldfinch, being furnished Soviet establishment offices, deal with susceptibilities of Soviet personnel to disciplinary measures as consequence of over-indulgence with alcohol, women and money. (S) ~~(U)~~

b7D

~~SECRET~~

(U)

1 - Mr. R. B. Wade

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

ADIC, New York (105-115626)

8/1/78

Director, FBI (105-216642)

OLEG A. LYALIN  
FCI - R

Reurtel 2/24/78.

For your information, FBIHQ agrees with your comments that it would be beneficial for Bureau representatives to interview subject regarding his radio training. [redacted] is being queried, along the lines you suggested, to determine the specific knowledge he might be able to provide. If [redacted] provides positive information in return, this information will be provided to you and a request can be submitted to personally interview subject based on his reply. (C) (U)

RBW:cml CMW  
(3)

NOTE:

Subject is a former KGB officer who defected to the British in 1974. Subject had undergone training as an illegal and NY has suggested that he be interviewed by Bureau representatives regarding the specific details of his radio operations as an aid to our illegals investigations. Above replies to that request. (C) (U)

EX-136

REC-70

105-216642-147  
SENT VIA FACSIMILE  
DATE 8/1/78 10:55 4 1978

Assoc. Dir. \_\_\_\_\_  
Dep. AD Adm. \_\_\_\_\_  
Dep. AD Inv. \_\_\_\_\_  
Asst. Dir. \_\_\_\_\_  
Adm. Servs. \_\_\_\_\_  
Crim. Inv. \_\_\_\_\_  
Ident. \_\_\_\_\_  
Intell. \_\_\_\_\_  
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Plan. & Insp. \_\_\_\_\_  
Rec. Mgmt. \_\_\_\_\_  
Tech. Servs. \_\_\_\_\_  
Training \_\_\_\_\_  
Public Affs. Off. \_\_\_\_\_  
Telephone Rm. \_\_\_\_\_  
Director's Sec'y \_\_\_\_\_

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

Classified by 7006  
Exempt from GDS, Categories 2 and 3  
Date of Declassification Indefinite

TELETYPE  
MAIL ROOM

via EMS

OPTIONAL FORM NO. 10  
MAY 1962 EDITION  
GSA FPMR (41 CFR) 101-11.0

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

# Memorandum

DIRECTOR, FBI (105-26749)  
(ATTN: INTD, PERSONAL ATTN: EUGENE C. PETERSON,  
SECTION CHIEF)

DATE: MAR 22 1978

ADIC, NEW YORK (105-115504) (C)

*[Signature]*  
ROB  
JAS

~~GOLDFINCH~~

REJECT:

FCI-R

ReBulet, 2/4/72, captioned "SPIA; ESP-R"; NYlet,  
3/9/72 with accompanying LHM; Bur/s, 4/11/74, with enclosed  
[redacted] let; NYlet, 5/31/74, with accompanying LHM and Bur/s,  
2/23/78 with [redacted] let attached, all captioned as above. ~~(S)~~ (U)

Enclosed herewith for the Bureau are five copies of  
an LHM, dated and captioned as above. (U)

The LHM is marked "Secret" since this matter has been  
so designated by [redacted] ~~(S)~~ (U)

By letter dated 3/9/72, the NYO requested [redacted] to  
elaborate on their identification of subject as [redacted] since  
their criteria was deemed insufficient according to FBIHQ's  
guidelines. ~~(S)~~ (U)

On 2/10/78, [redacted] answered our request for elaboration  
of their identification by restating their initial rational. ~~(S)~~ (U)

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

Classified by ~~SP-3~~ 3137

Exempt from GDS, Category 3

Date of Declassification Indefinite

*105-216642*

NOT RECORDED  
191 MAR 29 1978

2 - Bureau (Encls. 5) (EMS)  
1 - New York

JPM:jam  
(3)

*8 1978*  
ENCLOSURE

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ORIGINAL FILE #

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~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

NY 105-115504

[redacted] There appears to be fundamental differences between [redacted] and the FBI as to criteria in determining bona fides as far as intelligence affiliation is concerned. It is felt that continuing polemics is unwarranted. ~~(C)(U)~~

b7D

UACB the NYO considers this matter closed with submission of this communication. ~~(C)(U)~~

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~



~~SECRET~~

UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

In Reply, Please Refer to  
File No.

New York, New York  
March 22, 1978

[redacted]

Goldfinch

b6  
b7C

[redacted]  
[redacted] Union of Soviet Socialist Republics (USSR).

[redacted] was in the United States (US) [redacted]

b6  
b7C

[redacted] 26th Session of the United Nations  
General Assembly (UNGA). During his stay in the US, no  
information was uncovered indicating [redacted] acted in any  
way outside the scope of his official duty.

The sum total of information at hand does not lend  
itself to designate the subject as an officer of the [redacted]

b7D

~~SECRET~~

Classified by MEED 3137  
Exempt from GDS, Category 3  
Date of Declassification Indefinite

This document contains neither recommendations nor conclusions  
of the Federal Bureau of Investigation. It is the property of  
the Federal Bureau of Investigation and is loaned to your agency;  
it and its contents are not to be distributed outside your agency.



ENCLOSURE 105-216642-

- Mr. R. B. Wade

FEDERAL GOVERNMENT

August 4, 1978

RE: **GOLDFINCH**

We have previously received accounts of Goldfinch reporting on illegals which contain a general account of illegals' communications including their receipt of radio broadcasts from Moscow. It would be most helpful to us if Goldfinch could be queried in detail regarding an illegal's radio operational training and signal plan. Specifically, we would be interested in such things as the time of day for transmission/receipt of broadcasts, frequencies used, call signs utilized and what methods are employed to receive messages and how often and what type messages need be acknowledged. We would appreciate any additional information which you believe would be pertinent to our inquiry. (S) (U)

1 - Legat, London

NOTE FOR LEGAT, LONDON:

This LHM has been furnished to Washington representative  
of [redacted] (U) b7D

1 - [redacted] 105-316642  
1 - [redacted]

1 - Liaison Unit

RBW:jly/kem (7)

NOTE: ✓

Goldfinch is the [redacted] code word for Oleg Adolfovich Lyalin, a KGB defector in 1971. (S) (U)

Original and one delivered to Was  
of [redacted] on 8/9/78

REG-40

105-316642-148  
CLASSIFICATION STATEMENT ON  
BUREAU COPIES ONLY

2 AUG 18 1978

EX-131

SECRET

b6  
b7C  
b7D

Classified by 7006 Rv  
Exempt from GDS, Categories 2 and 3  
Date of Declassification Indefinite

REF. 8 1978

Airtel

1 - Mr. R. B. Wade

~~SECRET~~

10/17/78

To: ADIC, New York (105-115626)  
From: Director, FBI (105-216642)  
OLEG A. LYALIN  
FCI - R

at

Reurtel 2/24/78 and Bulet 8/1/78.

b7D  
ReBulet advised that [redacted] was being queried regarding subject's radio training. For your information, [redacted] has advised that all relevant reports of subject concerning illegals communications have been furnished the FBI. [redacted] notes that subject's training took place in the 1960s and that his technical coverage was never comprehensive. Further, [redacted] expressed its doubts that it would be profitable to question subject along the lines you have previously suggested noting that Western intelligence is now better informed. (S) (U)

In view of the above, FBIHQ is taking no further action in regard to your personally interviewing subject. [redacted] did furnish a report on the receiving of agent broadcasts based in part on subject's reporting which will be furnished you by separate cover. (S) (U)

RBW:kem (3)

HCC 139

NOTE:

Subject is a former KGB officer who defected to the British in 1971. Subject had undergone training as an illegal and NY suggested he be interviewed by Bureau representatives regarding the specific details of his radio operations. This question was generally raised with the British by memo dated 8/4/78. They have indicated that all relevant information has been furnished the Bureau and above so advises NY. (S) (U)

Assoc. Dir. \_\_\_\_\_  
Dep. AD Adm. \_\_\_\_\_  
Dep. AD Inv. \_\_\_\_\_  
Asst. Dir.:  
'Adm. Servs. \_\_\_\_\_  
Crim. Inv. \_\_\_\_\_  
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Tech. Servs. \_\_\_\_\_  
Training \_\_\_\_\_  
Public Affairs Off. \_\_\_\_\_  
Telephone Rm. \_\_\_\_\_  
Director's Sec'y \_\_\_\_\_

MW

OCT 18 1978

~~SECRET~~

Classified by 7006  
Exempt from GDS, Categories 2 and 3  
Date of Declassification Indefinite

SENT VIA FACSIMILE  
DATE 10/17/78; 06

NOV 6 1978

MAIL ROOM

Teletype (Ems) EJ rel  
EJ TMS

~~Top Secret~~ Control Number

HQ 78-2407 & HQ-18-2482

b7D

Originator of Material



Division, FBIHQ or outside agency)

Letter  Airtel \_\_\_\_\_

Date of Mail 9/22/78

LHM \_\_\_\_\_ Memo \_\_\_\_\_

Report \_\_\_\_\_ Other  enc.

Teletype \_\_\_\_\_

Captioned:

*Goldfinch*

This serial is under the control of the ~~Top Secret~~ Control Officer located in the Document Classification Office.

Authority - 62-116065

File number 105-216642-150

*[Signature]* PERMANENT SERIAL CHARGE-OUT

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION  
Records/Operations Sections

April 1st, 1986

- Name Searching Unit, 4543, TL# 115.  
 Service Unit, 4654, TL# 225  
 Special File Room, 5991, TL# 122  
 Forward to File Review, 5447, TL# 143  
 Attention Holden, PA  
 Return to Washington, D.C., 20535-4502  
Supervisor, Room, TL#, Ext.

Type of Search Requested: (Check One)

- All References (Security & Criminal)  
 Security Search  
 Criminal Search  
 Main 105 or 65 References Only

Scope of Search: (Check One)

- Restricted Search (Active Index - 5 & 20)  
 Restricted Search (Active & Inactive Index - 5 & 30)  
 Unrestricted (Active & Inactive Index)

Special Instructions: (Check One)

- Exact Name Only (On the Nose)  
 Buildup  Variations  
 Restricted to Locality of \_\_\_\_\_

Subject Oleg Lyalin

Birthdate & Place \_\_\_\_\_

Address \_\_\_\_\_

Localities \_\_\_\_\_

R# \_\_\_\_\_

Date 4/1

Searcher

Initials Oleg

Prod. \_\_\_\_\_

FILE NUMBER

SERIAL

105-216642

Oleg d  
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Oleg Adelfo  
65-74219

Classified By G-3

Declassify on OADR

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED  
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED EXCEPT  
WHERE SHOWN OTHERWISE

EXEMPTED FROM AUTOMATIC  
DECLASSIFICATION  
AUTHORITY DERIVED FROM:  
FBI AUTOMATIC DECLASSIFICATION GUIDE  
EXEMPTION CODE: 50X(1-HUM)  
(U) DATE 08-05-2015 BY: C32W33B91

~~S E C R E T~~

Subject: VIET DEFECTORS  
Subject: SOVIET DEFECTORS  
Character: FCI-R  
Character: FCI-R

This document is classified "Secret" in its entirety.

IN VIEW OF THE SENSITIVITY

EXTREME CAUTION MUST BE EXERCISED IN THE HANDLING OF INFORMATION ATTRIBUTED TO THIS SOURCE AND NO ACTION TAKEN WHICH WOULD CONCEIVABLY JEOPARDIZE THE SECURITY OF THIS SOURCE OF INFORMATION.

THETURE IN COMMUNICATIONS PREPARED FOR DISSEMINATION OUTSIDE THE BUREAU [REDACTED] SHOULD BE CHARACTERIZED AS "A SOURCE WHO HAS FURNISHED RELIABLE INFORMATION IN THE PAST." IT SHOULD THEREAFTER STATE THAT THIS INFORMATION WAS RECENTLY RECEIVED FROM THE SOURCE AND NO DATE SHOULD BE SET FORTH IN THE DISSEMINATION.

~~S E C R E T~~  
Classified (U)  
Classified By: G-3R  
Declassify On: OADR

11-Person  
11-Bureau (0 ; viet Defector)  
(2-105-105-Soviet Defector)

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(1)  
(1)  
(1)

(1-105-352523)

(1-CI-3A)

1-(1-RMI 4220)

1-Charlotte [REDACTED]

1-San Diego [REDACTED]

8-washington field (viet Defector)

(1-105-4751)(Soviet Defector)

(1)

(1-105-106153)(viet Defector)

[REDACTED]

(S)

LWG:bp  
(21)

53 OCT 1986

NOT RECORDED  
SEP 29 1986

5/6/86

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~~SECRET~~ (U)

IN THE EVENT THIS INFORMATION IS TO BE DISSEMINATED  
FURTHER, EXTREME CAUTION SHOULD BE UTILIZED IN REPORTING THE  
MANNER IN WHICH THE INFORMATION WAS OBTAINED [redacted] (S)


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[redacted] NO DISSEMINATION IS TO BE MADE OF ANY INFORMATION [redacted] (S)  
[redacted] WITHOUT PRIOR BUREAU AUTHORITY.

~~SECRET~~ (U)

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
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FBI

TRANSMIT VIA:

- Teletype
- Facsimile
- AIRTEL

PRECEDENCE:

- Immediate
- Priority
- Routine

CLASSIFICATION:

- TOP SECRET
- SECRET
- CONFIDENTIAL
- UNCLAS E F T O
- UNCLAS

Date 10/28/85

TO: DIRECTOR, FBI  
FROM: SAC, CINCINNATI (RUC)

EXEMPTED FROM AUTOMATIC  
DECLASSIFICATION  
AUTHORITY DERIVED FROM:  
FBI AUTOMATIC DECLASSIFICATION GUIDE  
EXEMPTION CODE: 25X(1,6)  
DATE 08-05-2015 BY: C32W33B91

OO:WFO

OO:WFO

~~SECRET~~ (U)

This communication is classified "SECRET" in  
its entirety.

Re CI teletype to Bureau dated 10/11/85.

Captioned subjects and their wives arrived in  
Cincinnati, Ohio, about noon on 10/10/85  
at the Westin Hotel downtown

b1  
b3

~~SECRET~~ (U)

Classified by G-3  
Declassify on OADR.

① Bureau

(②-105-

(2-105-216642)

4-Washington Field Office

(CI-4)

(CI-5)

2-Cincinnati

GHB:bev (10)

12 NOV 1 1985

b1  
b3

Transmitted

Per

per)

(Time)

(S)

105-216642  
NOT RECORDED  
5 DEC 6 1985

53 JAN 18 1985

~~SECRET~~ (U)

ORIGINAL FILED

~~SECRET~~ (U)

(S)

(S) [redacted] was parked in a city underground garage and remained there for the duration of their visit. During the stay, no local or long distance telephone calls were made from their hotel rooms.

Their transportation around town was furnished by their host

b1  
b3


b1  
b3

b1  
b3

(S)


~~SECRET~~ (U)

~~SECRET~~ (U)



(S)

b1  
b3



(S)

b1  
b3

~~SECRET~~ (U)


~~TOP SECRET~~ (U)

(S)

b1  
b3

b1  
b3

(S)



[redacted] they exhibited total  
cooperation toward the FBI.

~~TOP SECRET~~ (U)

4\*

~~TOP SECRET~~ (U)

~~SECRET (U)~~

SUBJECT: [REDACTED]  
CHARACTER

b7D

IN VIEW OF THE SENSITIVITY OF [REDACTED]  
EXTREME CAUTION MUST BE EXERCISED IN THE HANDLING OF ANY  
INFORMATION ATTRIBUTED TO THIS SOURCE AND NO ACTION TAKEN  
WHICH COULD CONCEIVABLY JEOPARDIZE THE SECURITY OF THIS  
SOURCE OF INFORMATION.

b7D

C  
IN COMMUNICATIONS PREPARED FOR DISSEMINATION OUT-  
SIDE THE BUREAU, [REDACTED] SHOULD BE CHARACTERIZED AS  
"A SOURCE WHO HAS FURNISHED RELIABLE INFORMATION IN THE  
PAST." IT SHOULD THEREAFTER STATE THAT THIS INFORMATION WAS  
RECENTLY RECEIVED FROM THIS SOURCE AND NO DATE SHOULD BE SET  
FORTH IN THE DISSEMINATION.

b7D

IN THE EVENT ATTACHED INFORMATION IS TO BE  
DISSEMINATED FURTHER, EXTREME CAUTION SHOULD BE UTILIZED IN  
REPORTING THE MANNER IN WHICH INFORMATION WAS OBTAINED BY  
[REDACTED]

b7D

NO DISSEMINATION IS TO BE MADE OF ANY INFORMATION  
DERIVED FROM ASSET WITHOUT BUREAU AUTHORITY.

b7D

CLASSIFICATION:

~~SECRET~~

The Bureau advised on 9/16 and 19/78 of the then  
recent receipt of the following information from [REDACTED]

b7D

④ - Bureau (61-3499)  
② - 105- [REDACTED] (LYALIN)

105-216642 -

~~NOT RECORDED~~

167 NOV 21 1978

"ROUTE IN ENVELOPE"

~~SECRET (U)~~

~~CLASSIFIED BY 7157~~

~~EXEMPT FROM GDS,~~

~~CATEGORY 2~~

~~DATE OF DECLASSIFICATION:~~

~~INDEFINITE~~

*Class Note*  
*Not Classified*

66 DEC 4 1978

b6  
b7C

~~SECRET~~

61-3499

It has currently been learned that prior to his defection OLEG LYALIN was considered to have a good reputation within the KGB, although he was known to have involved himself with females. LYALIN was known to speak English extremely well.

It has also been learned that of the 105 diplomats expelled by the British following LYALIN's defection, not all of the diplomats were in fact KGB officers. Therefore, if the British based their expulsion on information from LYALIN that they were KGB officers, then LYALIN listed too many KGB officers in London. However, LYALIN also missed some of the

b7D

It has also been learned that the KGB Center in Moscow now feels that [redacted] activity in England is back to normal.